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FIFA and the ugly side of the beautiful game 
2014. A World Cup year. A World Cup in Brazil, home of ‘the beautiful game’. A 
World Cup which saw Germany become World Champions, beating Argentina 1-0 in 
the final after extra time. A World Cup of many excellent football matches and 
performances. A World Cup in which the hosts and most successful team in the 
history of the tournament contrived to lose 7-1 to Germany; a record defeat for the 
country and the most goals it has conceded in a World Cup match. A World Cup in 
which a non-toxic spray applied from a small aerosol became an unlikely star. A 
World Cup in which one of the world’s finest football players, Luiz Suarez was 
suspended from all football-related activity for four months  after biting his Italian 
opponent, Georgio Chiellini; Suarez’s third such offence. A World Cup prefaced by 
widespread protests and unrest in Brazil, these focusing on: the cost and social 
impact of the tournament; the destruction of favelas and forced displacement of up 
to 1.5m citizens; and claims and counter-claims of the likely economic impact of the 
tournament. 
2014.  A World Cup year. A year in which the World Cup organiser, world football’s 
governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), a non-
governmental organization located in Switzerland, has been at the centre of media 
and political interest long before and after Mario Götze’s winning goal for Germany. 
A year in which almost as many column inches have been devoted to FIFA’s decision 
to host future World Cups in Russia in 2018 and Qatar in 2022 as to the one that was 
held in Brazil. A year in which words like ‘corruption’, ‘bribery’, ‘patronage’ and 
‘cronyism’ have been as prevalent in World Cup reporting as Messi, Ronaldo, 
Neymar and Muller; as commentators sought to make sense of a decision to host the 
tournament in Qatar, a country in which there is no discernible football culture and 
where summer temperatures average around 41°C. 
2014. Could it possibly be the World Cup year? Or more accurately, could it possibly 
be the year in which FIFA is finally held to account?  
FIFA’s association with governance failure and lack of accountability is not new: it 
has long been seen a self-servient institution, one reluctant to allow any external 
involvement in its activities (see, for example, Jennings, 2004, 2007; Tomlinson, 
2014a,b).  To those unfamiliar with sport and sport governance FIFA’s repeated 
failures and failings will be difficult to comprehend. Yet arguably FIFA’s governance 
challenges and failures are akin to structural weaknesses, these arising inevitably out 
of fundamental contradictions in the role of world football’s governing body.  
 
Founded in 1904, FIFA is a non-profit organisation. Like other global sporting 
organisations (GSOs) it lays claim to being a public interest organisation and to 
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holding an important place in global civic society. Its current strapline is: ‘For the 
game. For the world’, while its objectives include the following: 
 To improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light 
of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values, particularly 
through youth and development programmes (FIFA Statute, 2014 Edition, 
Para. 2(a)). 
(FIFA is not alone among sport GSOs in having such ambitious objectives. For 
example, FINA, world swimming’s governing body, includes among its objectives ‘to 
promote and encourage the development of international relations’ (FINA C5 
Objectives, para c, 2013)). 
But as well as being a non-profit organisation concerned with broad sport and social 
policy objectives, FIFA is also one of the most successful multinational enterprises in 
the world. It has successfully expanded into emerging markets and has even begun to 
make inroads into the American market.  According to consultants, AT Kearney, 
football represented 43% of the worldwide sports market by value in 2009 (Gapper, 
2014). Its former Chief Executive, João Havelange was instrumental in recognising 
the commercial potential of football in the global market, and he worked closely with 
Horst Dassler of Adidas to establish markets, attract global sponsors and reshape 
FIFA’s primary product, the World Cup (Tomlinson, 2014). More than that, the 
monopoly nature of the World Cup, coupled with the fact there continue to be many 
bidders willing to host the event, enables a great deal of the tournament costs to be 
passed directly to host nations. Players are drawn from professional clubs who are 
obliged to release their players. While the redistribution of economic power to 
football players and football clubs over the last three decades or so has been well 
documented, two points are worth highlighting in the context of the World Cup: first, 
that for the most part the motivation for the world’s best players tends to be non-
pecuniary in nature, apparently focusing more on things like patriotism and 
footballing ambition than on finance; and second, that cognisance of the continuing 
demand shown by supporters, national associations and players for the tournament, 
results in clubs accepting an agreed compensation of $2,800 per day for their 
players’ participation over the defined World Cup period.  
In seeking to understand the development of organisations like FIFA and their 
inability to cope with the challenges they face in areas like governance, Forster and 
Pope (2004) set out an ends-means inversion hypothesis. They suggest that a non-
profit organisation like FIFA has a tendency for its original ends or objectives (in this 
case, promoting and supporting football, its competitions and its regulations) and its 
financial means of achieving those ends to be inverted. So, while the original ends of 
GSOs were originally supported by membership fees and contributions from national 
federations, over time the creation  and commercial exploitation of hallmark events -  
in FIFA’s case, the first World Cup held in Uruguay in 1930 - fundamentally changed 
the relationship with its members. Far from FIFA being dependent on national and 
regional associations, football via the World Cup, controlled and owned by FIFA, 
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became the means by which it attained its goals and asserted it dominance. Moreover 
many of FIFA’s national member federations and regional federations now have a 
high degree of dependence on FIFA.  
The abstract nature of FIFA’s objectives then compounds the ends-means inversion. 
Its objective is not apparently to generate profit or revenue. Furthermore it has no 
shareholders or investors to hold it to financial account. Ostensibly FIFA is 
accountable to those member associations and regional federations in terms of its 
abstract objectives, but in circumstances where those same stakeholders are the 
principal financial beneficiaries of the commercial success of the World Cup. 
Furthermore those stakeholders are also responsible for electing those same FIFA 
officials who are in control of the distribution of financial rewards. The result? Good 
governance principles like transparency, accountability and equity end up replaced 
by poor governance outcomes like circularity, patronage and opacity.  As Tomlinson 
notes: “FIFA remains accountable solely to its Congress, where the single votes of 
American Samoa or Vanuatu continue to be as significant as the single votes of 
Argentina or Spain; and the benefits of FIFA patronage are not cheaply given up by 
Congress members/delegates” (2014b). 
So in the absence of an effective system of hierarchical accountability is there any 
prospect of holding FIFA to account? This was the question posed by the academic 
Robert Pielke in a paper published in 2013. His approach was to critique different 
mechanisms of accountability; his overall conclusion depressing.  
Supervisory accountability – the relationship between organisations – presents 
challenges in terms of holding FIFA to account for two reasons. First, where there is 
a close relationship between domestic football governance and a national 
government, the pre-eminence of football as a global sport, coupled with the 
presence in FIFA’s statutes of a right to suspend national football associations where 
there is evidence of ‘government interference’, acts as a disincentive for most 
national governments to demand supervisory accountability. Second, in many 
countries, national associations - including those in Scotland and England - have an 
arms’ length relationship with government. Hence, the supervisory authority of 
member associations is limited to that set out in FIFA’s own governance rules, often 
requiring ‘super majorities’ or permitting decisions to be taken behind closed doors 
(Pielke, 2013).  
Fiscal accountability – mechanisms of control over funding - is restricted both by the 
limited transparency which results from FIFA’s status as a Swiss-based organisation, 
and the challenges of compelling greater transparency from associations and 
confederations in terms of their use of funds distributed by FIFA. In relation to 
supervisory and fiscal accountability, it is certainly true that there has been some 
recent comment attributed to current and previous football administrators in 
England and Germany to the effect that further unwillingness on FIFA’s part to act 
transparently should result in countries leaving FIFA and/or boycotting future World 
Cups (see, for example, DW, 2014; Sky Sports, 2014). In Hirschman’s terms (1970), 
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this is the governance response of exit, i.e. withdrawal from the relationship.  To 
date, however, a little talk by a very small number of people is all that there is, and 
hence to many observers we remain with Hirschman’s governance by voice, where 
the aim is to influence through communication or dialogue. FIFA’s track record in 
this regard, however, suggests that this may well remain a dialogue of the deaf.  
Turning to public reputational accountability, notwithstanding its claims to be a 
public interest organisation, FIFA has no direct accountability to the public. 
Moreover, the extent to which weaknesses in football governance (however serious) 
has a demonstrable impact on the public reputation of the organiser of the (best 
ever?) World Cup is a moot point at best.  
While Pielke’s overall conclusion to his question was ‘not easily’, he does offer a little 
hope in the form of legal accountability which he suggests provides the ‘most 
significant opportunity for stakeholders in international football to hold FIFA 
accountable, as it is grounded in governance processes broader than FIFA itself and 
where mechanisms of accountability are well established’. Central to this is the 
indirect exposure of FIFA to legislation. Corporate sponsors for the World Cup in 
Brazil included multinationals like Adidas, Budweiser, Coca-Cola, Emirates, 
McDonald and Sony. All of these multinational sponsors find themselves exposed to 
and at risk from their relationships with FIFA and hence have a direct stake in FIFA’s 
performance, reputation and standing. Over recent years the response of such 
sponsors to the ongoing weaknesses in FIFA’s governance has tended toward public 
statements expressing ‘disappointment’ and ‘desire for change’, the suspicion being 
that unless or until there was an impact on their financial performance, sponsors 
would be content with the notion of voice discussed previously. However, the 
publication of the summary of ethics committee judge, Hans-Joachim Eckert, in 
respect of the findings of Michael Garcia’s investigation into the bidding processes 
for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups and subsequent fall out may just have moved the 
goalposts. At least two of sponsors have now indicated an intention to exit, in other 
words to withdraw from their relationship with FIFA. First to sever ties was Emirates 
Airlines, a sponsor since the 2006 World Cup in Germany, and an official partner 
from 2007 to 2014; followed on by news that Sony, a long term partner of FIFA, did 
not plan to renew its sponsorship contract (Reuters, 2014). It will come as little 
surprise to most readers, however, that FIFA has claimed that these decisions are 
unrelated to the World Cup bidding controversy (Sport Business, 2014)! Leaving that 
partial view aside, such decisions are surely predicated on the objectives of these 
multinationals and on their accountability to their own shareholders. In the absence 
of any other apparent means of effectively holding FIFA to account or shaping its 
governance, it is perhaps something of a paradox that a combination of legal and 
most particularly market accountability may offer the most likely route to reform of a 
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